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Abstract 
This objective of this study is to examine the impact of 
audit quality on accounting conservatism in Turkey. Using 
three different measures of accounting conservatism, we 
report that audit quality, in terms of brand name auditor 
and industry specialist auditor, is positively related to 
conservatism. Our results hold after controlling for 
operating cash flow, leverage, firm age and sales growth. 
Overall, the evidence is consistent that accounting 
conservatism complements firms in the Turkish business 
environment that engage with high quality auditors to 
mitigate agency costs. 
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1. Introduction 
Despite the availability of  several studies, the quality of accounting information remains a 
subject that requires in-depth investigation in different economic environments (Dechow, 
Ge, & Schrand, 2010: 67), including in the Turkish context. Giving a general definition to the 
quality of accounting information is not a simple task. A transaction or event revealed or 
measured by a particular accounting standard could represent good information according 
to one agent but not by another. The dynamic and complex firm activities generate a concrete 
conceptualization of the quality of accounting information. Despite this difficulty, various 
characteristics of the quality of accounting information are described by researchers of the 
topic (Burgstahler, Hail, & Leuz, 2006; Dechow et al., 2010).  
Accounting conservatism represents one of the significant features of the quality of financial 
information. Conservatism is subjective in nature, and it is involved in most accounting 
conceptual frameworks. Numerous studies have examined accounting conservatism in 
different financial and economic environments (Basu, 1997; Ball & Shivakumar, 2005; 
Cullinan, Wang, Wang, & Zhang, 2012). In general, these studies have focused on 
conservatism as a practice of asymmetric recognition which emphasizes on the accounting 
norms with highest liabilities/expenses of lowest assets/revenues. The more timely 
recognition of bad news (losses) is often correlated with accounting conservatism (Basu, 
1997).  
Accounting conservatism could be affected by the characteristics of each area, such as the set 
of accounting standards adopted in the country. For instance, Ball, Kothari, and Robin (2000) 
reveal that accounting reports of firms in countries with code law systems are less 
conservative than those of firms in common-law  systems. Moreover, Barth, Landsman, and 
Lang (2008) state that firms that implement International Financial Reporting Standards 
(IFRS) report losses on a more timely basis than those that do not. Dechow et al. (2010) 
report that when enforcement mechanisms are strong, such as the legal system, auditing and 
corporate governance loss recognition is more appropriate. External auditing represents 
one of the fundamental mechanisms that leads managers to practice accounting 
conservatism. The independent auditors’ main task is to check whether or not the financial 
statement is prepared in accordance with the accounting standards that the organization 
follows. 
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Turkey is one of the developing countries in the emerging market. The capital market of 
Turkey is characterized by weak institutional mechanisms, such as weak accounting 
standards, law enforcement and shareholders’ and creditors’ protection (Yurtoglu, 2003). 
The Capital Market Board (CMB) of Turkey issued the Communiqué on Independent Auditing 
Standards in Capital Markets (Serial: X, No: 22) in 2006 in order to ensure the currency of 
the financial report. The report includes the independence of auditors and the legal 
requirements. It also regulates the quality of audit services by identifying its tenure, 
describing the audit scope and announcing auditing standards in line with the International 
Standards on Auditing (ISAs). According to the guidelines of the Communiqué report, all the 
listed firms on Borsa Istanbul (BIST) are required to have an independent external auditor 
for the fiscal year-end financial report.  Consequently, a new Turkish Commercial Code was 
established and became effective on 1 July 2012 in order to enhance the financial report, 
auditing and corporate governance (Karaibrahimoglu, 2013).  
It is suggested that an independent auditor constrains earnings management, particularly in 
countries where there is effective audit and oversight mechanisms for auditors (Becker, 
DeFond, Jiambalvo, & Subramanyam, 1998). However, auditors might not constrain the 
practices of earnings management when the institutional setting does not prompt auditors 
for high quality audit (Jeong & Rho, 2004; Nichols & Smith, 1983). In the environment of 
Turkey where there is little risk of litigation against auditors, the penalty mechanism against 
auditors is not fully implemented in practice and not sufficiently restrictive. This is contrary 
to DeAngelo's (1981) theory which states that Big4 auditors might not restrict earnings 
management practices in clients’ firms. Thus, there would be no differences in audit quality 
between Big4 and non-Big4 audit firms.  
According to Dechow et al. (2010), the influence of auditors on the quality of financial 
information is derived from their effective role in minimizing misrepresentation, deliberate 
or not, of the economic and financial reality of the firm. Therefore, the financial statement 
that is audited by an independent external auditor is more likely to be having better 
information content, resulting in better decisions by users, and hence, producing greater 
economic benefits. 
The purpose of this study is to investigate the influence of audit quality measured by industry 
specialist auditor and auditor brand name on the level of accounting conservatism in Turkey, 
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in which the institutional setting does not encourage auditors to provide high quality audit. 
The reminder of this paper is categorized as follows: Section 2 describes the background of 
audit quality and previous studies on accounting conservatism; section 3 illustrates the 
research design; section 4 discusses the results; and section 5 concludes the paper.   
2. Prior Research and Hypothesis Development 
Audit quality  
Audit quality is considered as one of the significant issues that influences the audit 
profession (Vanstraelen, 2000). Audit quality is also an attribute that is valued by the equity 
market (Franz, Crawford, & Johnson, 1998). It is suggested that high quality audit services 
improve the quality and credibility of the financial statement from the perspective of other 
contracting parties, particularly, other parties that are not involved in the preparation of the 
financial statement (Wallace, 2004). The reliability and accuracy of financial information 
have a fundamental role in ensuring the quality of auditing. Specifically, earnings 
conservatism, in the wave of accounting scandals in the United States (US) and many 
European countries, has highlighted the importance of audit quality.     
Efficient auditing of firms can confirm the validity of the presented financial numbers, 
evaluate the extent to which managers maintain financial reporting integrity and ensure the 
firms’ monitoring structure and effectiveness. The consequences of a good audit report are 
that it discourages earnings management and improves investors’ trust and firm value 
(Balasubramanian, Black, & Khanna, 2010; Black, 2001; Borokhovich, Brunarski, Crutchley, 
& Simkins, 2004). In other words, high quality auditing could enhance investors’ protection 
and firm value (Black, 2001). It is suggested that a good audit report would seek to ensure  
high quality accounting disclosure by reducing information asymmetry among the users of 
accounting information, and consequently, decrease the cost of equity and improve the 
terms of financing (Ashbaugh & Pincus, 2001; Botosan & Plumlee, 2002). However, investors 
would avoid to their capital market due to the reluctant of information asymmetry that could 
also create a situation of more dispersed financial analyst forecast, market illiquidity and 
higher cost of equity (Healy, Hutton, & Palepu, 1999; Lang & Lundholm, 1996). Therefore, 
being audited by a Big4 auditor could reflect the firms’ determination to produce high quality 
financial reports and to offer stakeholders with proprietary and private information that 
consequently can minimize the extent of accounting manipulations (Palea, 2007). 
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The agency theory is address to examine the monitoring role of the external auditor in 
aligning the interests between the agent and the principal (Jensen & Meckling, 1976; Watts 
& Zimmerman, 1986). The external auditor is an essential mechanism of corporate 
governance to improve the reliability of the financial report. According to agency theorists, 
external auditors not only explicit of shareholders’ interests; they also assist in corporate 
management work in terms of access to capital, decreased cost of capital and inherent 
restrictions on management actions (Firth, 1997). Owusu-Ansah (1998) and Apostolou and 
Nanopoulos (2009) report that external auditors improve the disclosure quality and 
practices at firm and regulatory levels.  
In this context, several studies have used different indirect measures for audit quality, such 
as audit firm size, to investigate the influence of audit quality. DeAngelo (1981b) analytically 
proves that audit quality of large audit firms, such as Big4 audit firms, is higher than small-
size audit firms (non-Big4). Several studies that have utilized audit firm size as a proxy for 
audit quality, have suggested that higher levels of audit quality by Big4 firms are associated 
with higher levels of earnings conservatism (Chung, Firth, & Kim, 2003; Iatridis, 2012; 
Krishnan, 2003). Big4 audit firms possess high reputational capital and are exposed to 
greater litigation risk. Therefore, based on the proposition of the reputational capital theory, 
large audit firms are more likely to provide high quality services in order to protect their 
reputational capital (Beatty, 1989). On the other hand, deep pockets advocators suggest that 
Big4 audit firms possess more wealth and capabilities; thus, they are more likely to provide 
high quality audit services in order to mitigate litigation risks inherent in audit services (Dye, 
1993). The rationale beyond the deep pockets hypothesis is that shareholders and other 
parties involved in contractual agreement are looking for big audit firms in order to gain 
restitution in case of any litigation risk. This is because big audit firms have more resources 
and wealth. Several previous studies have focused on examining the influence of audit firm 
size as a proxy for audit quality (Francis and Wang, 2008; Iatridis, 2012; Paulo, Cavalcante, 
& Paulo, 2013); auditor tenure (Ghosh & Moon, 2005; Stanley & DeZoort, 2007) on earnings 
conservatism. This study focuses on examining the association between audit quality 
measured by brand name auditor and industry specialist auditor on accounting 
conservatism. Several studies have investigated the association between audit quality 
Journal of Accounting, Finance and Auditing Studies 5/2 (2019) 1-23 
6 
 
measured by auditor brand name and earnings quality. Cano-Rodríguez (2010), for example, 
address the relationship between auditor brand name and conditional and unconditional 
accounting conservatism. The finding of the study shows that Big4 auditors enhance the 
quality of information by encouraging clients to increase conditional conservatism in their 
financial statements.         
Using a sample of non-financial listed firms from two different institutional settings 
(common-law and code-law), Iatridis (2012) examined the influence of auditor brand name 
on earnings management and accounting conservatism.  The results of the study indicate 
clients in common-law countries, like South Africa, are more conservative with high level of 
earnings quality as they react to bad news on a more timely basis. Becker et al. (1998) and 
Reynolds and Francis (2000) for example, report that high quality auditors (in their case, 
Big6) are more capable of detecting earnings management due to their superior knowledge; 
they also act to restrict opportunistic earnings management in order to protect their 
reputation. Becker et al. (1998), Francis, Maydew, and Sparks (1999) and Reynolds and 
Francis (2000) find that discretionary accruals for clients of Big6 auditors are lower than 
those of non-Big6 auditors. Teoh and Wong (1993) show a positive correlation between 
auditor brand name and earnings response coefficient.   
In addition, few studies have directly tested the correlation between audit quality measured 
by industry specialist auditor and accounting conservatism. A number of studies have 
provided evidence that an industry specialist auditor gives a higher level of assurance than 
a non-specialist auditor (Beasley, Carcello, Hermanson, & Lapides, 2000; Craswell, Francis, 
& Taylor, 1995). Balsam, Krishnan, and Yang (2003) investigated the correlation between 
industry specialist auditor and earnings quality. The findings suggest that earnings quality 
for clients of industry specialist auditors is higher than for clients of non-specialist auditors. 
Using a large sample of clients of Big6 auditors, Krishnan (2003) examined the level of 
discretionary accruals on industry specialization. The findings of the study suggest that 
clients of non-specialist auditors have higher levels of discretionary accruals than clients of 
specialist auditors. The finding of the study is consistent with the perception that audit 
quality is higher for industry specialist auditors than non- specialist auditors. Owhoso, 
Messier, and Lynch (2002) report that the ability to detect errors within their industry by 
industry specialist auditors is greater than non-specialist auditors. Dunn and Mayhew 
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(2004) document that disclosure quality of firms audited by industry specialist auditors is 
ranked higher by financial analysts. This suggests a positive association between industry 
specialist audit firms and financial disclosure quality. Gramling and Stone (2001) find that 
earnings of clients of industry specialist auditors are presented more accurately than clients 
of non-specialist auditors.  Carcello and Nagy (2004) provide evidence from the US that there 
is a negative correlation between industry specialist auditors and financial reporting fraud. 
Meanwhile, Lys and Watts (1994) find that there are no fundamental differences in the levels 
of auditor litigation between specialist and non-specialists auditors.   
In summary, the results of prior studies on brand name auditor and industry specialist 
auditor are both in favour of and against the quality of audit. The recent Turkish Commercial 
Code was established in order to enhance the quality of audit and accounting information for 
firms listed on BIST. Audit quality depends to a large extent on its application of the practices 
of accounting conservatism by clients. Hence, this study investigates the effect of brand name 
auditor and industry specialist auditor on accounting conservatism.                       
Conservatism and Turkey 
Studies on accounting conservatism go back a few decades and have been written by a 
number of well-known authors in the field, such as Basu (1997) and Watts (2003), who 
investigated the impact of accounting conservatism on the financial statement and its users. 
Ruch and Taylor (2015) have two points of view regarding the informational roles of 
accounting conservatism. The first viewpoint sees the function of accounting conservatism 
as a technique to capture information used to measure the market value of equity for 
investment decision purposes; while, the second viewpoint is on the primary function of 
accounting conservatism as a technique to provide information that permits contracting 
parties to assess whether or not contract obligations are well performed. Contacting parties, 
especially creditors, prefer to see timely reporting of bad news about earnings. Since the 
main purpose of external audit is to certify that the financial statement is fairly presented, 
accounting conservatism is often utilized as a method of accounting quality (Francis, 
Schipper, & Vincent, 2005). The principles of accounting conservatism have impacted 
accounting theory and practice for centuries (Basu, 1997). Conservative reporting 
represents higher accounting quality compared to more aggressive accounting practices and 
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involves the timely recognition of bad news in earnings (Basu, 1997; Ball & Shivakumar, 
2005; Watts & Zimmerman, 1986; Watts, 2003). 
A few studies have investigated accounting conservatism in the Turkish setting. Balsari 
(2010) evaluated the influence of adopting the IFRS on the conservatism level of financial 
reports for firms in Turkey. The study results show that the adoption of IFRS boosts both 
timeliness and earnings conservatism (asymmetric timeliness). The influence of IFRS 
adoption is greater for financial firms, small-size firms and for firms having low debt levels. 
The author examined the influence of the change in accounting regime on earnings 
conservatism in Turkey. Turkey represents an unfavourable environment because of the 
country’s code-law system, weak corporate governance, poor institutional settings, such as 
accounting standards, shareholders’ protection, law enforcement and a middle-income 
developing market. Çalişma (2013) examined the association between conditional 
conservatism and value relevance of earnings on a sample of 106 manufacturing Turkish 
listed firms. The findings of the study suggest that the incorporation of conditional 
accounting conservatism in the financial statement reduces the value relevance of earnings 
in Turkish manufacturing firms. The author proposes that the study results support the 
decision of the International Accounting Standards Boards (IASB) for the elimination of 
accounting conservatism from the conceptual framework.  
Audit quality is about the fair representation of financial information and a significant 
component of accounting quality is conservatism in reported earnings (Francis et al., 2005). 
Only a number of studies have investigated conservatism for firms in Turkey. Generally, 
previous studies have emphasized on the adoption and implementation of additional 
regulations, such as the IFRS and other regulations, following the financial crisis on 
accounting quality. Thereby, accounting conservatism is an appropriate topic to investigate 
the influence of auditor brand name and industry specialist auditors for firms in Turkey.  
Research Hypotheses 
Previous studies have suggested that firms audited by Big4 firms are more likely to present 
high quality audit, value relevant earnings and less accounting errors in their financial 
statement (Francis & Krishnan, 1999; Krishnan, 2003). Meanwhile, these kinds of firms are 
subject to achieving more favourable audit reports. According to DeFond and Jiambalvo 
(1994), big audit firms are more likely to produce an independent and objective audit report 
Journal of Accounting, Finance and Auditing Studies 5/2 (2019) 1-23 
9 
 
and less inclined to give into managers’ opportunistic behaviour. In addition, firms audited 
by Big4 firms have less tendency for financial fraud (Carcello & Nagy, 2004) as well as high 
levels of earnings conservatism (Chung et al., 2003).  
Cano-Rodríguez (2010) examined the association between auditor brand name and 
accounting conservatism. The study results indicate that providing high audit quality by 
external audit firms promotes clients’ request for high levels of conditional accounting 
conservatism. Iatridis (2012) finds that firms which engage with high quality auditor in 
common-law countries, such as South Africa, possess more incentives to implement high 
levels of accounting conservatism and high earnings quality as they recognize bad news on 
a timely basis. Becker et al. (1998) and Reynolds and Francis (2000), for example, report that 
high quality auditors (in their case, Big6) are more capable of detecting earnings 
management due to their superior knowledge; besides, they restrict opportunistic earnings 
management in order to protect their reputation. Moreover, Lim (2011) indicates that there 
was a negative relationship between audit quality and accounting conservatism in 1998; 
while in 2002, clients hired high quality auditors and demanded high levels of accounting 
conservatism. This was due to the collapse of one of the big audit firms in 2002 that 
consequently attracted firms’ attention to rely on the monitoring role of external audit firms.    
 H1: Turkish firms audited by Big4 auditors demand high levels of accounting 
conservatism. 
Proponents of industry specialist auditors have suggested that specialist audit firms in a 
particular economic sector are necessary to obtain more knowledge and experience about 
clients’ activities and to provide better services. Kwon (1996) reports that industry specialist 
auditors possess the industry expertise that leads to improving the understanding of clients’ 
business. Thereby, audit firms specialized in a particular sector would be more able to 
provide high audit quality services and better quality of reported accounting information 
(Keefe, King, and Gaver, 1994; Sun and Liu, 2011). Meanwhile, the fact that industry 
specialists can offer higher audit quality suggests that they could charge the client more or 
higher audit fees. According to Craswell et al. (1995), audit firms develop industry-specific 
skills and expertise over and above ordinary auditors’ expertise in order to obtain a 
reputation as industry specialist. Therefore, audit firms require normal returns on their 
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investment in order to invest in industry expertise, and thus, be able to charge higher audit 
fees compared to non-specialist auditors.      
Keefe et al. (1994) showed that industry specialist auditors are correlated with less 
breaching of the Generally Accepted Auditing Standards (GAAS). Wright and Wright (1997) 
indicate that industry specialists have greater ability to produce alternative hypotheses 
when attempting to recognize accounting errors. Solomon, Shields, and Whittington (1999) 
investigated the knowledge of industry specialist auditors and find that they possess more 
insights into non-error explanations for unpredicted ratio fluctuations in analytical 
procedures. Owhoso et al. (2002) find that the effectiveness of detecting errors for auditors 
who are working within their industry is higher in staff working papers during the audit 
review process. Moreover, Balsam, Krishnan, and Yang (2003) and Krishnan (2003) evinced 
that industry specialist auditors are correlated with lower levels of earnings management. 
In addition, the occurrence of fraud is lower (Carcello & Nagy, 2004); and the quality of firms’ 
disclosure is better (Dunn & Mayhew, 2004) for firms audited by industry specialist auditors. 
Kwon, Lim, and Tan (2007) find a positive association between industry specialist auditors 
and earnings informativeness in an international setting of 28 countries with different legal 
and regularity frameworks. Furthermore, Krishnan (2005) provides empirical evidence that 
is consistent with the notion that specialist auditors acquire resources, industry expertise 
and the incentives to detect losses and encourage clients to in a timely manner. The author 
further indicates that clients of industry specialist auditors report losses in a more timelier 
manner than clients of non-specialist auditors. Therefore, this study assesses whether or not 
there is a positive influence of industry specialist auditors on the level of accounting 
conservatism in Turkish listed firms. 
H2: Clients audited by industry specialist auditors are more conservative than clients 
audited by non-specialist auditors.    
3. Research Design  
Sample 
This study is based on a sample of Turkish firms listed on BIST from 2011 to 2015. Static 
panel data is employed in which the same firms serve on the panel over a five-year period. 
The main advantage of using panel data is that it offers a sensitive measurement to the 
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changes between points in time (Cavana et al., 2001). The years from 2011 until 2015 are 
selected as the annual reports of all listed firms were available when data collection started.  
Calculation of accounting conservatism  
Following Ahmed and Duellman (2007), the main test of this study is based on accrual-based 
conservatism as suggested by Givoly and Hayn (2000). The accrual-based measure of 
accounting conservatism includes income before extra-ordinary items minus cash flow from 
operations plus depreciation expense divided by total assets, and averaged over a 5-year 
period, cantered on year t, multiplied by -1. Positive values of accrual-based indicate greater 
conservatism. The essence underlying this measurement is that the result of conservative 
accounting is persistently negative. Conservative accounting is higher when the negative 
average accruals over the respective period is higher. Dividing over a number of periods 
indicates that the influence of any temporary large accruals are diminished, since accruals 
tend to invert within a one to two-year period (Richardson, Sloan, Soliman, & Tuna, 2005). 
Accrual-based measure of accounting conservatism is not influenced by economic rents or 
growth opportunities. Nevertheless, it ignores the influence of conservatism in prior periods; 
hence, it does not reflect total or accumulative conservatism.  
The asymmetric timelines measure of conservatism estimated cumulatively over several 
prior years as suggested by Roychowdhury and Watts (2007) is also utilized as a second 
measurement for accounting conservatism in this study. This measure captures the influence 
of the negative and positive returns on earnings. Roychowdhury and Watts (2007) note that 
Basu's (1997) measure of accounting conservatism ignores the impact of conservatism prior 
to the estimation period and that it might not properly reflect total conservatism. Hence, 
Roychowdhury and Watts (2007) recommend that the Basu model could provide a better 
measure of conservatism if it is estimated cumulatively over the past three years. 
 = 	 +      +      +     ∗   +  
Where  represents income before extraordinary items cumulative for firm i from year 
t-5 divided by total assets at the beginning of the fiscal year; D is an indicator variable set 
equal to 1 if the market adjusted annual stock returns is negative and 0, otherwise; and 
R is the market adjusted stock returns at the end of the fiscal year t-5.  
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Auditor brand name and industry specialist auditor 
Brand name auditor indicates whether or not firms are audited by one of the Big4 audit firms. 
Brand name auditor is measured in this study following Balsam, Krishnan, and Yang (2003), 
Caramanis and Lennox (2008) and Francis (2004). The proxy for brand name 
auditor is AUDbig4 . Firms take a value of 1 if they employ one of the Big4 audit firms to 
audit their financial statements; and 0 if the firms employ non-Big4 audit firms as their 
external auditor.  
To indicate industry specialization of the independent auditor, this study follows the 
measure used by Keefe et al. (1994) and Sun and Liu (2011) to categorize an audit firm as an 
industry-specialist. The proxy for industry specialization (AUDISA) takes the value of 1 if 
the audit firm has clients from the same industry, representing 15% or greater of its net 
revenue, and otherwise, 0. 
Regression model  
The following regression model developed by Givoly and Hayn (2000) is used to assess the 
level of accounting conservatism. Meanwhile, this study includes the variables of brand name 
auditor (AUDbig4 ) and industry specialization (AUDISA) to capture the influence of audit 
quality on accounting conservatism. Model 1 employed to test the hypotheses is explained 
as follows:  
ACCRit-5 = β0 + β1 AUDbig4it-5+ β2AUDISAit-5 + β3OCFL + β4LEVE+ β5FAGE+ β6SAGR+ ε it-5 
Where ACCRit-5 is accruals conservatism; AUDbig4it-5 is the log of auditor brand name; and 
AUDISAit-5   is the log of industry specialist auditor. Following Ahmed and Duellman (2007), 
the control variables utilized in this study are firm size, leverage and litigation risk. Firm size 
represents the natural log of average total assets ("#). Large firm sizes have higher 
political costs that encourage them to practice more accounting conservatism (Watts & 
Zimmerman, 1986). Leverage is the total long-term liabilities divided by total 
assets ($%&). According to Ahmed, Billings, Morton, and Stanford-Harris (2002), the level 
of conservatism is greater for firms suffering from high bondholder-shareholder conflicts. 
Litigation risk is a dummy variable equivalent to 1 if the firm is in a technology sector, 
otherwise, 0 ($(). Ahmed and Duellman (2013) report that firms that have higher 
litigation risk would be more likely to adopt accounting conservatism to mitigate these risks.  
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Accounting conservatism is also measured in this study using the asymmetric timeliness by 
Roychowdhury and Watts (2007). This asymmetric timeliness measure of conservatism is a 
computes Basu (1997) measure over the past three years in order to provide a better 
estimation for conservatism. The following equation is Roychowdhury and Watts' (2007) 
measure of conservatism, including the control variables (SIZ, LIT, LEV): 
NIit-5 = β0 + β1 + β2  + β3  ×  + β4 AUDbig4it-5+ β5AUDISAit-5 + β6OCFL + 
β7LEVE+ β8FAGE+ β9SAGR+ ε it-5                                                                                                       Model 2    
Where NIit-5 is income before extraordinary items divided by beginning of fiscal year total 
assets;   *+ an indicator variable that is equal to 1 if the market-adjusted returns for 
firm i during year t is negative, and 0, otherwise;   is market-adjusted annual stock 
returns for firm i in year t. 
Following Givoly and Hayn (2000) and Alam and Petruska (2012), we use an additional 
measure of accounting conservatism: Market-to-book (MTB) ratio.  Model 3 provides the 
regression models utilized to investigate the relationship between external monitoring 
mechanisms (e.g., AUDBIG4 and AUDISA) with the MTB ratio of conservatism. The control 
variable, leverage (LEVE) is predicted to have a negative coefficient because profitable 
companies are more likely to possess lower leverage (Myers, 1977). We predict a positive 
relationship between firm age (FAGE) with clients’ incentive to engage with a strong 
monitoring mechanism. Older firms are more likely to be controlled by family founders and 
this could enhance their entrenchment effects (Liu, Ahlstrom, & Yeh, 2006; Wong, Chang, & 
Chen, 2010). Thus, to create a protected environment for investors, particularly minority 
shareholders, older firms are likely to adopt high accounting conservatism (Al-Sraheen, 
2014). We control for sales growth, measured by the annual percentage growth in total sales 
because sales growth is likely to influence ACCR for three reasons. First, sales growth will 
influence accruals, for instance, receivables and inventories, which in turn, influence ACCR. 
Second, for firms with declining sales, accrual is likely a poor measure of accounting 
conservatism. Third, large growth in sales often inflates market expectations of future cash 
flows, which might influence ACCR. Cash flows from operations is another control variable 
in this study, and we predict a positive relationship following Ahmed et al. (2002) and 
Lennox et al. (2012)  that profitable firms are more conservative than others.  
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4. Results and Discussion 
Table 1 lists accrual-based conservatism as a measure of accounting conservatism, followed 
by corporate governance variables, particularly external mechanisms and the control 
variables. A dichotomous measurement, Big4 and non-Big4/Specialist auditor and non-
specialist auditor are used as audit quality measurements in this study.  
Table 1. Descriptive statistics for the variables of the study 
Variables N Mean Min Max Std. Dev 
1.ACCR 728 -0.029 -0.599 0.275 0.813 
2.AUDBIG4 728 0.527 0 1 0.499 
3.AUDISA 728 0.176 0.000 0.820 0.223 
4.OCFL 728 10.485 2.833 15.296 2.038 
5.LEVE 728 0.482 0.000 3.804 0.287 
6.FAGE 728 35.347 1 80.00 18.414 
7.SAGR 728 -0.023 -0.009 -6.543 0.936 
   Source: Author’s compilation 
Table 1 show the average value of ACCR is -0.0295. This value is lower than the average value 
of ACCR at 0.010 and –0.004, reported by Ahmed and Duellman (2007) and Ahmed, Billings, 
Morton, & Stanford-Harris (2002), respectively. This difference could be due to different 
institutional settings, for instance, ownership structure, as Turkish firms are characterized 
by high concentrated ownership in contrast to dispersed ownership in the US. This ratio 
indicates that the level of conservatism amongst Turkish firms is low. The average number 
of firms engaged with Big4 audit firms is 0.527 and the average value of SPECLST_MS is 0.167 
for the full sample. The average operating cash flow (OCFL) measured by is 10.485 with a 
minimum value of 2.833 and a maximum value of 15.296. The mean ratio of total debt to 
total assets (LEVE) of the firms in the sample is 0.482 with a minimum value of 0.287 and a 
maximum value of 3.804. The mean level of firm age (FAGE) is 33.825 with a minimum and 
maximum value of 1 and 80, respectively. This range is very close to the study conducted by 
Gacar (2016) in the context of Turkey that reports a mean value of 39.910, standard 
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deviation of 15.211, a minimum of 0.60 and a maximum of 81.00. The mean of depreciation 
is 8.890 with a minimum of 0.693 and a maximum value of 17.000 with standard deviation 
of 2.328. The mean of sales growth is -0.023 with a minimum of -0.009 and a maximum value 
of -6.543 with standard deviation of 2.328.  
The correlation coefficient between accounting conservatism and the variables display the 
expected sign. As with previous studies, the highest correlation coefficient is for FAGE. 
Further, AUDBIG4, AUDISA and FAGE have positive correlation with ACCR. In contrast, LEVE 
has a negative correlation with ACCR. Variables exhibiting insignificant results are OCFL and 
SAGR. Table 2 displays that there are no correlation coefficient values above 0.90; this 
reveals that there is no sign of potential multicollinearity (Hair, Anderson, Babin, & Black, 
2010). Next, this study discusses the multivariate analysis used to test the developed 
hypotheses. According to the findings reported in Table 3, for audit quality measured by 
brand name auditor and industry specialist auditor and control variables (OCFL, LEVE, FAGE 
and SAGR), the values are 90.74, 0.11 and 0.16 of the total variance of accounting 
conservatism at the 1% level of significance in Model 1, Model 2 and Model 3. 
Table 2. The Correlation Matrix of the Variables of the Study  
Variables 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
1.ACCR 1             
2.AUDBIG4 0.08 1           
3.AUDISA 0.09 0.21 1         
4. OCFL -0.04 -0.07 0.35 1       
5. LEVE -0.08 0.08 -0.01 0.08 1     
6. FAGE 0.11 0.12 0.31 0.05 0.06 1   
7. SAGR 0.01 0.04 -0.01 -0.14 0.03 -0.08 1 
 
The regression results in Model 1 show that audit quality in terms of AUGBIG4 has a 
significant influence on the demand of clients for a strong monitoring mechanism in terms 
of accounting conservatism. The analysis in Table 3 shows that each brand name auditor 
leads to an increase in accounting conservatism by some 0.066 (0.66%).  
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Table 3. Results of the Regression analysis 
Item 
ACCR 
Model 1 
 
NI 
Model 2 
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R - - 0.204*** 0.054 - - 
DR - - 1.075** 0.340 - - 
DR*R - - -0.453** 0.157 - - 
AUDBIG4 0.066*** 0.163 0.182** 0.073 0.338** 0.120 
AUDISA 0.250** 0.111 0.323** 0.128 1.029*** 0.161 
LEVE -0.399** 0.178 -0.001 0.002 -0.020*** 0.004 
FAGE 0.007** 0.002 -0.036 0.123 0.225** 0.073 
SAGR -0.001 0.000 0.029 0.025 -0.081 0.029 
OCFL 1.970* 1.180 -0.127 0.055 -0.161* 0.088 
Wald chi2/ R2 90.74  0.16  0.11  
Prob > chi2     0.000  0.000      0.000  
Notes: * = significant at 10%, ** = significant at 5% and *** = significant at 1%.     
 
This relationship is not only direct but also highly significant at the 1% level of significance 
(p = 0). This result concurs with that documented by Ararat et al. (2015a, 2010) and Cano-
Rodríguez (2010). The implication is that there is a positive effect of AUGBIG4 on ACCR. 
Brand name auditor has an essential role to maintain conservatism practices in reported 
earnings (Basu, 1997). The results of AUDISA indicate that for every increase of specialist 
auditor, there is an increase in the level of accounting conservatism. The result shows a 25% 
impact on ACCR and this relationship is also highly significant at the 5% level of significance. 
This reflects that AUDISA is more likely to enhance the quality of the financial report because 
audit firms specialised in a specific industry are more likely to apply high conservatism 
practices. This view is supported by Krishnan (2003) who report that auditees involved with 
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industry specialist auditors, are less likely to be involved in high discretionary accruals. 
Vinten et al. (2005) argue that industry specialist auditors are more likely to reduce 
discretionary accruals adopted by management than non-specialist auditors. It is logical to 
suggest that AUGBIG4 and AUDISA are more experienced and prudent and they have strong 
incentives and abilities to select high accounting conservatism. This study’s results are in 
line with the agency theory’s propositions that corporate governance mechanisms are 
considered as important factors to mitigate agency cost between agents and principals. For 
the control variables, FAGE and OCFL are positively correlated with accounting 
conservatism; while LEVE and SAGR are negatively correlated with accruals conservatism. 
The results of Model 2 and Model 3 are generally consistent with the result of Model 1. 
However, the result of AUGBIG4 is decreased from 1% in Model 1 and 5% level of significance 
for both Model 2 and Model 3; while, the result of AUGISA is significant at the 5% level of 
significance for Model 2 and 1% level of significance for Model 3. 
5. Conclusion 
We examine whether audit quality, in terms of brand name auditor and industry specialist 
auditor, influence the quality of financial reporting, specifically accounting conservatism. 
Using three different proxies of accounting conservatism, we find accounting numbers 
reported by Turkish firms are conservative. The research hypotheses are on the relationship 
between the quality of audit (e.g., brand name auditor and industry specialist auditor) and 
the level of conservatism. According to the evidence presented, we note that conditional 
conservatism is greater in the numbers reported by firms audited by Big4 auditors and 
industry specialist auditors as opposed to Non-big4 auditors and non-specialist auditors. 
Therefore, Big4 auditors and industry specialist auditors provide higher quality audit 
services which positively influence the level of conservatism. We suggest that future studies 
include other attributes of corporate governance, particularly ownership structure or even 
the quality of accounting information, such as value relevance, earnings management and 
the relationship between the study constructs before and after the regulatory changes in 
2012. In addition, other methods of data collection, such as questionnaire and interviews 
with analysts, auditors and professionals involved with the audit work could be used to 
verify that these professionals contribute to better quality of information.    
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